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Introduction
The literature on EU–Ukraine relations has focused 
on a central and recurrent set of challenges: does the 
EU have sufficient power of attraction for the lead-
ing European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) country, 
Ukraine? and do the EU’s policies have a norma-
tive governance effect on Ukraine? Some studies see 
this as a question of the usefulness of the ENP as a 
tool for the promotion of governance. While there is 
agreement that the EU should conduct a strict ‘con-
ditionality policy’ in its neighbourhood, and that this 
effect has been more visible in the EU’s immediate 
neighbourhood (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008), 
some studies have indicated that the ENP is a ‘phan-
tom carrot’ (O’Donnell and Whitman 2007), and its 
conditionality a ‘conditionality lite’ (Sasse 2008). Ba-
sically, these and other studies hold that the impact 
of EU incentives on internal political governance has 
been limited in Ukraine. 
Still, Ukraine holds a central position in the ENP, and 
there has been steady progress in the development 
of new agreements. As the gradual step-by-step proc-
ess of EU policies towards its eastern neighbourhood 
unfolded, the intention became to replace the PCA 
agreement, which regulated the EU–Ukraine rela-
tionship from 1994 (effective from 1998) until 2008, 
by an Association Agreement (AA). Recent research 
has indicated that, below the surface of political frays, 
Ukraine is indeed ‘highly active’ but also ‘most reluc-
tant’ in the ENP, with sector-based convergence with 
EU standards in selected sectors (Langbein and Wol-
czuk 2012). Considerable EU funding has also been 
provided. Starting from 1991, the assistance provided 
by the EU alone has amounted to over €3 billion, and 
the European Neighbourhood Policy instrument has 
Summary
As 2012 unfolded, what could have become the year 
when Ukraine concluded an Association Agreement 
with the EU proved the most ‘political’ year ever 
in EU–Ukraine relations. Especially the court case 
against Yulia Timoshenko, former prime minister 
and presidential candidate in the 2010 presidential 
elections, has remained problematic as a glaring 
example of not only selective justice, but selec-
tive injustice. Subsequently, the EU has promoted 
a policy of strict conditionality in the observance 
of democratic elections, legal affairs and human 
rights as a condition for its Association Agreements.
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allocated €470 million to Ukraine for the years 2011 to 
2013 (EU–Ukraine Summit 2013). 
Moreover, the EU has a long history of involvement 
with Ukraine, and the signing of an Association Agree-
ment (AA) would have been the logical outcome. In-
deed, the 906pp Agreement that was ready in 2012 was 
meant to solidify the ENP approach of ‘approximation 
without membership’, as well as providing strong in-
centives for Ukraine to enter into advantageous trade 
relations with the economically by far more powerful 
EU through a deep and comprehensive free trade agree-
ment (DCFTA). However, as 2012 proceeded, a signing 
of the AA seemed further removed from the agenda, 
due to political controversies over Ukraine’s laggard 
compliance with democratic standards of governance.
This policy paper discusses the political conditionality 
of EU policies toward Ukraine. It holds that the prima-
ry obstacle to a more effective EU incentive policy has 
been the court case against former PM Julia Timosh-
enko, which is a blatant violation of EU legal norms. 
It does not posit, however, that EU policy of ‘political 
conditionality’ is ineffective. While any ‘Europeaniza-
tion’ of Ukraine seems off the agenda, the EU still of-
fers considerable incentives for Ukraine, echoing the 
observation that ‘EU conditionality is mainly positive, 
that is, the EU offers and withholds carrots but does 
not carry a big stick’ (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 
2008: 190). If ratified, the Association Agreement 
will become a ‘pilot agreement’ for all EU Eastern 
Partnerships and the first comprehensive agreement 
in a new set of agreements for the EU. Moreover, it 
will be a stepping stone to a Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) between the EU and 
Ukraine. Thus, the EU provides considerable incen-
tives for Ukraine to adjust its standards of government 
and economic restructuring, by outlining a process of 
clear-cut conditionality and rewards.
The EU: a ‘Reluctant’ Promoter of Governance?
The ‘political conditionality’ of withholding ‘rewards’ 
but not pushing for change is a well-established 
understanding of how the European Union works 
(Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 2008). This holds also 
for its role as a promoter of democracy and govern-
ance in the neighbourhood. Indeed, the EU ‘is not so 
much setting its own standards of formal democracy, 
but borrows them from other institutions, most nota-
bly the OSCE/ODIHR and the Council of Europe (in-
cluding the Venice Commission)’ (Casier 2011: 960). 
The EU’s approach to issues of political governance is 
an indirect one: it does not instruct national govern-
ments on how to reform the polity, but works through 
international organizations, trans-governmental insti-
tutions and legal frameworks to shape a positive envi-
ronment for the wider effect of a unified Europe.  
This has consequences for the formulation of EU poli-
cies towards Ukraine, and also for the specific role 
that the EU plays in promoting democratic standards. 
Casier (2011) distinguishes between formal democra-
cy (institutions and procedural rules) and substantive 
democracy (societal control over politics), and holds 
that the EU provides incentives for compliance in 
both fields – and demands it. Whereas Ukraine made 
progress in the field of formal democracy from 2006 
to 2010, the main obstacle to ‘progress’ in substantive 
democracy today is the dominant role of competing 
oligarchies in the country (Casier 2011: 965). This is 
reflected in a recent report indicating that ‘informal’ 
relations constitute the backbone of Ukrainian poli-
tics, whereas formal institutions have less significance 
(Matuszak 2012). 
Casier (2011) notes that the EU has had an effect on 
formal democracy in Ukraine, and that most assess-
ments have deemed the institutional changes to the 
country’s electoral law and the relationship between 
the government and the presidency ‘progressive’. 
However, the annulment of the 2004 agreement be-
tween the Orange camp and the Party of Regions and 
the reintroduction of a presidential system stand out 
as a reversal of this progress (Flikke 2011). Since 2010, 
there has been a steady decline in democratic stand-
ards. Two Freedom House reports from 2011 and 2012 
sounded the alarm on reversals in Ukraine’s regional 
electoral legislation, the concentration of power in the 
Ukrainian presidency and the Party of Region bloc in 
the Rada, as well as changes made in the Constitu-
tional Court (Kramer et al. 2012). As the 2012 report 
concluded, ‘The Ukrainian government is pursuing 
contradictory policies. On the one hand, Ukraine’s 
leadership seeks to integrate Ukraine into Europe, 
hence its pursuit of the DCFTA; at the same time, it is 
trying to emasculate the domestic opposition and civil 
society’ (ibid. 2012: 5). 
 
The Timoshenko Case: the EU at the Fore
The arrest of Ukraine’s former PM Julia Timoshenko 
in October 2011, as well as of former Timoshenko asso-
ciates like Yuri Lutsenko, former Minister of Internal 
Affairs, put the EU in a difficult situation. First and 
foremost, these cases accentuate a political dilemma: 
the EU cannot and will not pursue a forward-leaning 
policy that would simultaneously undermine the va-
lidity of norms and governance in the EU neighbour-
hood. Nor will the EU make any concessions on is-
sues of formal democracy with a country in line for an 
AA. That said, these cases are only the tip of the ice-
berg: more fundamental structural changes have been 
made to the electoral law, the regional elections and 
the constitutional court. The danger is that the issue of 
‘personalities’ will usurp the focus, diverting attention 
from more substantial structural changes. 
3In fact, the EU has succeeded in focusing less on per-
sonalities, and more on issues of norms, or rather – 
the problem of the lack of formal and substantive de-
mocracy. In his statement at the Plenary Session of the 
European Parliament in Strasbourg on 22 May 2012, 
the Commissioner for Enlargement, Stefan Füle, 
moved beyond the rhetoric of systemic reforms, not-
ing: ‘Politically-motivated justice is a systemic prob-
lem in Ukraine, and it needs a systemic solution in the 
form of a comprehensive judicial reform’ (Füle 2012a). 
Following up on this at the EU–Ukraine Parliamenta-
ry Committee in June 2012, he stressed explicitly: ‘the 
European Union no longer wants explanations from 
Ukraine, it wants visible action, and in particular in 
three areas’: these he identified these as parliamentary 
elections, selective justice, and governance reforms 
(Füle 2012b).
These demands were linked to the EU incentive poli-
cies. At the 16th EU–Ukraine summit on 25 February 
2013, the EU demonstrated a clear logic of condition-
ality concerning the planned signing of the AA at the 
November 2013 Eastern Partnership summit, holding 
as a precondition that ‘concrete action [is] being taken 
in the three key areas set out in our joint communi-
qué: changes in the electoral code; overall political and 
economic reforms and decisively addressing the issue 
of selective justice. These are real and feasible bench-
marks, which have to be tackled in the very ‘short 
term’ (Barroso, 2013). This clear-cut conditionality pre-
pares space for a more comprehensive and organized 
EU policy, linking the Timoshenko case to the issue of 
formal democracy (institutions and procedural rules) 
and not to a specific ‘hobby-horse’ of this or that pol-
itician. Indeed, the ruling of the European Court of 
Justice from 30 April 2013 has served to reinforce the 
indirect approach to issues of legality, formal democ-
racy and substantive democracy of the EU. By deem-
ing the arrest and imprisonment of the former prime 
minister as ‘arbitrariness’ and calling the review of the 
lawfulness of her arrest ‘inadequate’, the Court lifted 
the issue to the level of formal democracy. 
Will EU conditionality have an effect? Strictly speak-
ing, clarity from the EU should induce a sense of clar-
ity also in Ukraine. For the EU, the fact remains that 
selective justice is still a highly problematic issue with 
Ukraine, simply because it cannot easily be framed 
as one that mirrors the level of relations offered by 
the EU. Concerning the former prime minister, the 
standard statement from Victor Yanukovich, current 
president of Ukraine, has been that due legal process 
should decide the fate of Yulia Timoshenko. This ‘due 
process’ has been a dubious one, however. Indeed, the 
set of charges has been expanded from the initial ac-
cusation that the former prime minister jeopardized 
national energy security by signing a gas contract with 
Russia in 2009. As Kuzio (2012: 433) held in 2012, ‘the 
imprisonment of Timoshenko, former Interior Minis-
ter Yuriy Lutsenko and other members of her 2007–
2010 government, has derailed Ukraine’s Association 
Agreement with the EU’. Even though Lutsenko was 
released in April 2013, this remains a stumbling block 
in Ukraine–EU relations.
Conclusions
This policy brief has discussed the effect of EU con-
ditionality and incentives on Ukraine. As the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy has developed toward an 
Association Agreement, the question of norms and 
governance has become more acute for both parties. 
At present, the issue of normative compliance over-
shadows even potential sector-level cooperation. This 
is unfortunate, since, as Langbein and Wolczuk (2012: 
864, 878) point out, convergence should not be stud-
ied solely as a ‘wholesale’ system of democratic gov-
ernance: ‘It is only at a sector-level that the domestic 
configuration of actors and their preferences can be 
fully assessed in the context of non-accession.’ Sector-
level cooperation is possible – especially if the AA is 
adopted – and could improve governance in Ukraine, 
providing valuable assistance to restructuring vital 
sectors. Moreover, it could give Ukraine greater le-
gitimacy. As Casier (2011: 970) notes, legitimacy is a 
primary incentive that the EU can choose to give, or 
not: ‘Ukraine seeks legitimacy with the EU, a sym-
bolic reward, which it perceives to increase chances 
of accession in the longer term. The EU may grant or 
withhold the legitimacy, as well as material forms of 
assistance.’ 
In order to be granted anything more than simply a 
symbolic reward, Ukraine will have to understand the 
importance of norms, and of complying with these. 
The EU may very well decide to give Ukraine this sig-
nificant symbolic reward – but not at the cost of com-
promising basic values of the European Union. 
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